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Torts
by Philip Comer Griffeth
and Cash V. Morris"
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2013 and May 31, 2014.1 During this survey period, the
Georgia Supreme Court decided several cases of significance in the
medical malpractice arena, and a seven-judge panel of the Georgia Court
of Appeals was called upon to decide a slip-and-fall case. Some might
argue that a few of these cases were victories for the plaintiff's bar.
However, a close reading of the opinions reflects some well-reasoned and
impressive legal arguments concerning the gross negligence and
summary judgment standards applied by Georgia's appellate jurists.
These opinions will be cited by both plaintiff's and defense attorneys in
future cases and by the courts in appellate decisions.
II.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Returning to its decision in Baker v. Wellstar Health System Inc. ,2the
Georgia Supreme Court, in Wellstar Health System, Inc. v. Jordan,'
made clear that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

* Solo Practitioner, Philip Comer Griffeth, LLC, Athens, Georgia. Davidson College
(B.A., 1989); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1991-1993); Georgia Survey Editor (1992-1993). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Manager of Contracts and Legal Affairs, Office of General Counsel, St. Mary's
Health Care System, Athens, Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology (B.S., with honors,
2003); Georgia State University of Law (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Phillip Comer
Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 265
(2013).
2. 288 Ga. 336, 703 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
3. 293 Ga. 12, 743 S.E.2d 375 (2013).
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of 1996 (HIPAA)4 and Baker are not the plaintiff's sword and shield to
control the dissemination and use of the plaintiffs personal health
information (PHI) in litigation.5 In this widower's wrongful death
action, the supreme court reviewed a trial court's order compelling the
defendant-healthcare providers to produce transcripts of defense
counsel's ex parte interviews of non-party healthcare providers who
treated the decedent that were conducted pursuant to a Baker qualified
protective order (the QPO).6 Relying on section 9-11-26(b)(3) of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 7 the defendants objected
to production of the interviews on work-product grounds. However, the
plaintiff maintained that the materials were discoverable under HIPAA
and the QPO. The QPO, which the trial court had granted, limited the
questioning in the interviews to the decedent's cancer diagnosis and
treatment, and the impact smoking had on her life expectancy or
enjoyment of life. The QPO also provided for the transcription of the
interviews but did not provide the plaintiff with notification of the
interviews or an opportunity to attend them. The order was silent
regarding the transcripts' purposes and production. Without any
explanation of its reasoning, the trial court directed the defendant to
produce the transcripts of the interviews. 8
Examining HIPAA and its privacy purpose, the supreme court found
no basis for mandatory production of the transcripts to the plaintiff.9
Indeed, the transcripts contained the decedent's PHI, and under the
United States Department of Health and Human Services' privacy
rules, ° which were promulgated pursuant to the department's statutory authority," health care providers are prohibited from disclosing a
person's PHI except in limited circumstances. 2 In fact, HIPAA
provides that an individual's right to access his or her own PHI is
limited in scope. 3 With a preamble stating that the regulations do not
seek to require disclosure of work product or to alter the rules of
discovery, HIPAA regulations expressly exempt from disclosure

4. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C. tits. 26, 29, 42).
5. See Jordan,293 Ga. at 14-15, 16, 743 S.E.2d at 378-79.
6. Id. at 12-13, 743 S.E.2d at 377.
7. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(bX3) (2014).
8. Jordan,293 Ga. at 12-13, 743 S.E.2d at 377.
9. Id. at 14, 743 S.E.2d at 378.
10. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500 to 164.534 (2013).
11. 67 Fed. Reg. 14776 (Mar. 27, 2002); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-l(d), 1320d-2
(2012).
12. Jordan, 293 Ga. at 14, 743 S.E.2d at 378.
13. Id.
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"[ilnformation compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil
: * * action or proceeding." 4 Plainly put, "HIPAA does not entitle an
individual to access protected work product in the possession of a
covered entity simply by virtue of the fact that it contains protected
health information. One seeking production of such information must
do so in accordance with applicable rules of discovery." 5
Looking at a QPO that was silent on the purpose, use, and production
of the transcripts and that contained no notification provision or right
to attend, the court was unpersuaded that the transcripts' purposes were
for later production any more than they were for in-camera review to
ensure the defendants did not exceed the QPO. 6 Citing well-established authority that attorney-witness interviews are work product 7
and finding no authority to require production of the transcripts under
HIPAA or the QPO, the supreme court vacated the trial court's order
with direction to conduct a hearing on whether the defendants waived
the work-product protection or if the plaintiff had "a substantial need for
the evidence and that it would cause an undue hardship to develop this
evidence by other means.""
Continuing to interpret the Tort Reform Act of 2005,'9 the supreme
court in Hankla v. Poste1120 made crystal clear its construction of
O.C.G.A. § 2 4-7-702(c)2 ' for the qualification of experts in medical
malpractice suits testifying to the applicable standard of care and the
2
parties' compliance with or deviation from that standardY.
Reviewing
a defense verdict, the supreme court affirmed the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversal of the trial court's qualification of the defense's expert
doctor's testimony that supported the defendant-nurse midwife's
handling of the complicated delivery of the plaintiff's son.' Although
the defense's expert physician was clearly knowledgeable, certified, and
experienced in the same deliveries, the supreme court determined that

14. Id. at 14-15, 743 S.E.2d at 378 (first alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.524(a)(1)(ii) (2013)).

15. Id. at 15, 743 S.E.2d at 378.
16. Id. at 15-16, 743 S.E.2d at 379. Although the court ruled in favor of the defendants,
it noted that, if good cause is shown, additional procedural safeguards such as notice,
attendance, transcription, and production, may be appropriate. Id. at 16, 743 S.E.2d at
379.
17. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
18. Jordan,293 Ga. at 15-18, 743 S.E.2d at 379-80; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(3).
19. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (amending O.C.GA. tits. 9, 24, 33, 43,
51).
20.

293 Ga. 692, 749 S.E.2d 726 (2013).

21. O.C.G.A. § 2 4-7-702(c) (2013).
22. Hankla, 293 Ga. at 692, 749 S.E.2d at 727-28.
23. Id. at 692-93, 749 S.E.2d at 728.
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the doctor was not qualified to testify under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2)
because she was neither "of the same profession" as the defendant (a
nurse midwife) pursuant to subparagraph (c)(2)(C), nor had she
"supervised, taught, or instructed" nurse midwives in accordance with
subparagraph (cX2)(D).24 O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c) provides, in pertinent
part,
[IUn professional malpractice actions, the opinions of an expert, who is
otherwise qualified as to the acceptable standard of conduct of the
professional whose conduct is at issue, shall be admissible only if, at
the time the act or omission is alleged to have occurred, such expert:
(1) Was licensed by an appropriate regulatory agency.. .; and
(2)... had actual professional knowledge and experience in the area
of practice or specialty in which the opinion is to be given as the result
of having been regularly engaged in:
(A)The active practice of such area of specialty of his or her profession
for at least three of the last five years ... ; or

(B) The teaching of his or her profession for at least three of the last

five years..

.; and

(C)Except as provided in subparagraph (D)of this paragraph: (i) Is a
member of the same profession... ; and

(D)Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code section, an expert
who is a physician and, as a result of having... supervised, taught, or
instructed [non-physician health care providers] has knowledge of the
standard of care of that health care provider under the circumstances
at issue shall be competent to testify as to the standard of that health
care provider.25
Affirming the court of appeals previous construction of O.C.G.A. § 247-702(c) in Smith v. Harris,26 the supreme court agreed that
[tihe legislature's use of the word "or" between subparagraphs (2)(A)
and (2)(B), followed by its use of the word "and" between subparagraphs (2)(B) and (2)(C), indicates that a medical expert must show
either "active practice" or "teaching" for "at least three of the last five
years," but that whichever of these may be the case, the expert must
also be "a member of the same profession" as the person whose
performance he is evaluating."
Therefore, "to qualify as an expert in a medical malpractice action...,
the witness must (1) have actual knowledge and experience in the

24. Id. at 693, 696, 749 S.E.2d at 728, 730; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702(c)(2)(C), (D).
25. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c) (emphasis added).
26. 294 Ga. App. 333, 670 S.E.2d 136 (2008).
27. Hankla, 293 Ga. at 694, 749 S.E.2d at 729 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith,
294 Ga. App. at 336-37, 670 S.E.2d at 140).
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relevant area through either 'active practice' or 'teaching' and (2)... be
in the 'same profession' as the defendant" or a physician with the
knowledge of the relevant standard of care as a result of having
supervised, taught, or instructed non-physician health care providers.2"
Even with this clear direction on the reading and application of the
statute, trial counsel may never feel entirely sure about their expert's
qualifications. As shown in Toombs v. Acute Care Consultants, Inc. ,29
qualification of these witnesses requires a lawyer-and ultimately the
court-to make a determination as to what "area of specialty [was] at
issue and what procedure or treatment was alleged to have been
negligently performed." 0 In Toombs, a widow filed suit against her
deceased husband's post-surgical care medical providers for failing to
evaluate his risk for and prevent a blood clot (deep vein thrombosis or
DVT) in his leg that broke loose and traveled to his lungs (a pulmonary
embolism or PE), resulting in his respiratory distress and death. At the
time of his death, Charles Toombs, Jr. was recovering in the hospital
from a second surgery to re-attempt a skin graft over a workplace
chemical burn. The plaintiff's expert, Michael S. Oleksyk, M.D., who
had decades of clinical experience and academic scholarship in the
evaluation, prevention, and treatment of post-surgical DVT and PEs,
opined that Toombs was at a significant risk for a DVT and PE and that
the defendants deviated from the standard of care in failing to evaluate
or reduce this risk. Despite this, Dr. Oleksyk was disqualified under
O.C.G.A. § 2 4-7-702(c) from testifying as to the standard of care
applicable to the treatment of a post-surgical burn-care patient who had
undergone skin-graft surgery."
Reversing the trial court's disqualification and consequential grant of
summary judgment, the court of appeals conducted the two-part inquiry
using the allegations in the complaint and attached affidavit, holding
that
the alleged negligence was the Defendants' failure to evaluate,
diagnose and properly treat Charles for an increased risk of DVT and
PE ....Accordingly, the area of specialty in this case concerns the
standard of care applicable to DVT prophylaxis in a hospitalized
patient who is at increased risk for DVT and PE. 2

28. Id. at 694-95, 749 S.E.2d at 729.
29. 326 Ga. App. 356, 756 S.E.2d 589 (2014).
30. See id. at 360, 756 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Anderson v. Mountain Mgmt. Servs., 306
Ga. App. 412, 414, 702 S.E.2d 462, 465 (2010)).
31. Id. at 356-57, 360, 756 S.E.2d at 590-91, 593.
32. Id. at 360, 756 S.E.2d at 593.
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33
Therefore, Dr. Oleksyk was more than qualified to give his opinion.
Although the result here is logical and clear, in a case with unclear
facts, poorly drafted complaints, and the complexities of medicine, this
determination may be a real challenge to practitioners without an
unlimited budget to explore the claims and hire experts.
Even when the expert is qualified, a trial court's evaluation of the
admissibility of expert testimony to the standard of care is complicated
by the relevancy and reliability gate-keeping requirements set forth in
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' and codified in O.C.G.A.
§ 24-7-702. 35 The difficulty is found even at the appellate level, where
a seven-member panel split 5-2 while reversing the trial court.36 In
Lavelle v. Laboratory Corp. of America,3 7 a widower brought suit
against Laboratory Corporation of America (LabCorp), among others, for
the failure of its employee-cytotechnologist (cytotech) "to detect abnormal
cells on a Papanicolaou ("Pap") smear test slide" that lead to delayed
detection and treatment of the plaintiff's wife's cervical cancer.3 8 The
plaintiff's expert, Dorothy Rosenthal, M.D., a Johns Hopkins staff
pathologist and professor of pathology oncology with experience
interpreting slides to detect cancer and abnormal cells, provided the
testimony regarding the standard of care for cytotechs reviewing Pap
smear slides and LabCorp's breach. Dr. Rosenthal testified to her
experience and the "focused review" methodology she employed in
forming her opinion that it would be a "blatant miss" and deviation from
the standard of care for any certified cytotech to fail to recognize the
obvious slide abnormalities and refer 39the slide for further review,
obviating the need for a blinded review.
After a Daubert hearing, the trial court limited Dr. Rosenthal's
testimony to her slide review, the applicable standard of care of

33. Id. at 360-61, 756 S.E.2d at 593.
34. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
35. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (2013); see also Daubert,509 U.S. at 594-95, 597.
36. See Lavelle v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 327 Ga. App. 142, 147, 151, 755 S.E.2d 595, 599,
602 (2014).
37. 327 Ga. App. 142, 755 S.E.2d 595 (2014).
38. Id. at 142, 755 S.E.2d at 596.
39. Id. at 143-44, 755 S.E.2d at 597. A blinded review, as opposed to the focused
review conducted by Dr. Rosenthal, contemplates "qualified reviewers without knowledge
of the clinical background in an environment that simulates normal screening, subjected
to an unbiased screening process[ ],also with a substantial number of normal and abnormal
gynecologic, cytologist sampling." Id. at 149, 755 S.E.2d at 600-01 (alteration in original)
(quoting Dr. Rosenthal's testimony). Interestingly, "two blinded reviews in this case
corroborated her already-formed opinion that the applicable standard of care had been
breached." Id. at 144, 755 S.E.2d at 597.
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cytotechs, and the abnormal slide referral requirement, but she was
unable to opine whether LabCorp's cytotech's performance was below the
standard of care. The trial court further excluded, on other grounds that
the plaintiff did not appeal, two blinded reviews that supported Dr.
Rosenthal's opinion. Seemingly relying on the blinded reviews as the
only acceptable method of evaluating whether the standard of care had
been breached, and those reviews having been excluded without mention
of her focused review, the trial court found no basis for Dr. Rosenthal's
opinion on the standard of care.4 °
The court of appeals reviewed the hearing record and written order
excluding Dr. Rosenthal's testimony with great attention to what it
determined to be the trial court's reliance on the cytotech professional
organization's 'blinded reviews" standards.4 ' The trial court held these
standards were the only slide review methodology that an expert could
use to reach an opinion about a cytotech's breach of the standard of
care.42 With "manifest abuse of discretion" as the standard for reversal, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in (1) holding
that the only reliable slide review methodology an expert in a cytotech
malpractice case could use to reach an opinion about whether the
cytotech breached the standard of care was a blinded review; and (2)
failing to conduct a Daubert hearing to assess the relevancy and
reliability of Dr. Rosenthal's focused reviews.4 3
Finding no law that supports a trial court's enforcement of a particular
expert review or testing methodology to ensure reliability, and bothered
by the trial court's adoption of a professional organization's standards,
the court revisited the gate-keeping purpose of Daubert and former
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.144 to ensure that an expert's testimony was reliable

and relevant, not to establish and enforce any particular methodologies

40. Id. at 144, 755 S.E.2d at 597-98.
41. Id. Focusing on the basis for Dr. Rosenthal's opinion in a focused review, the court
of appeals dispensed with the trial court's finding that Dr. Rosenthal admitted her opinion
was not in conformity with a blinded review with respect to certain requirements she
stated were necessary to assert a breach of the standard of care. Id. at 146, 755 S.E.2d at
599.
42. Id. at 145, 755 S.E.2d at 598.
43. Id. at 145, 146, 755 S.E.2d at 598, 599.
44. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2010) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (2013)). The
'gatekeeping requirement" is intended "to make certain that an expert, whether basing

testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field." Lavelle, 327 Ga. App. at 146, 755 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
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an expert should use.45 Turning to Dr. Rosenthal and the fact that her
opinions were not based on a blinded review, but rather a focused
review, the court vacated the trial court's exclusion and remanded the
case for the trial court to consider Dr. Rosenthal's focused-review
methodology in a Daubert hearing.4 On remand, the trial court was
instructed to determine if the methodology could be the basis for a
reliable and relevant opinion under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b)
regarding
whether the LabCorp cytotech breached the standard of
47
care.

The court of appeals stated that the statute did not require a specific
finding of fact by the trial court in its Daubert analysis, but this
omission was clearly important to the reversal. 4 Had the trial court
written clear factual findings that the focused review methodology
lacked reliability pursuant to Daubert,the court of appeals likely would
not have had the impression that any particular methodology was
enforced or that the trial court failed to conduct a Daubert analysis,49
making a reversal based on manifest abuse of discretion very difficult.

As Judge Boggs wrote in his dissent, "A remand for mere clarification of
the trial court's well-supported decision is a pointless exercise and a
waste of scarce judicial resources." 0
In his dissent, Judge Boggs essentially conducted a Daubertreliability
and relevancy analysis that supported the trial court's exclusion and saw
no indication of a manifest abuse of discretion nor any pronouncement
as to the appropriate methodology, but rather a "ruling on the evidence
before it."5 Focused on the court of appeals standard of review, Judge

45. Lavelle, 327 Ga. App. at 145-46,147, 755 S.E.2d at 598,599. In fact, as cited in the
opinion,

in another case involving opinion testimony from Dr. Rosenthal, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia stressed that in excluding her
testimony it was not holding that the methodology set forth in the professional
association guidelines was "the only methodology that would allow an expert to
offer an opinion on the standard of care for a cytotechnologist in reviewing Pap

smear slides."
Id. at 146, 755 S.E.2d at 598-99 (quoting Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 1:10-CV-3309WSD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13582, at *48-49 n.ll (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2012), rev'd in part,
760 F.3d 1322, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding manifestly erroneous the trial court's
determination that Dr. Rosenthal's focused review methodology was unreliable)).

46. Id. at 147, 755 S.E.2d at 599.
47. Id. at 146-47, 755 S.E.2d at 599.

48. See id. at 147, 755 S.E.2d at 599.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 150, 755 S.E.2d at 601 (Boggs, J., dissenting).

51. Id. ("[Tihe trial court here was not making any general pronouncement on 'the only
acceptable methodology,' but simply ruling on the evidence before it, including the expert's
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Boggs noted that the trial court had reviewed lengthy scientific
depositions, held evidentiary hearings, and read the parties' briefs, and
it entered a "lengthy, detailed, comprehensive order" on the exclusion of
Dr. Rosenthal's testimony.5 2 Judge Boggs discussed many potential
pieces of evidence that called into question the relevancy and reliability
of Dr. Rosenthal's opinion on a cytotech's breach of the applicable
standard of care, including the following: Dr. Rosenthal's potential
review biases based on attorney communications; her regular review of
high-risk slides as opposed to the overwhelming amount of normal slides
reviewed by cytotechs; the difference between the focused-review
technique and a cytotech's computerized restricted field of view; the
inexact nature of slide interpretation; and intraobserver variability and
known lab error rates.5 3 From that evidence, Judge Boggs determined,
iT]he trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the opinion
of a physician pathologist interpreting a single slide which she knows
to be abnormal is irrelevant in determining a breach of the standard
of care on the part of a nonphysician cytotechnologist engaging in an
initial screening review of numerous slides, almost all of which will be
normal. 54
Further, unlike the majority, Judge Boggs concluded that Dr. Rosenthal's testimony foreclosed the reliability of her methodology because she
agreed, upon questioning by the court, that blinded reviews consistent
with industry cytotech guidelines were necessary to establish an opinion
on a cytotech's breach of the standard of care with respect to a particular
slide.5 5
Following disagreement in a seven-member panel of the court of
appeals in Johnson v. Omondi16 regarding the application of the
heightened evidentiary burden and lowered standard of care at summary
judgment under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c), 7 the supreme court granted
certiorari "to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly applied
the standards for a medical malpractice claim in a hospital emergency
department."5 8 O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) provides that "a health care

own testimony.").
52. Id.
53. Id. at 147-48, 755 S.E.2d at 600.
54. Id. at 148, 755 S.E.2d at 600.
55. Id. at 149, 755 S.E.2d at 601-02.
56. 318 Ga. App. 787, 736 S.E.2d 129 (2012), vacated, 294 Ga. 74, 751 S.E.2d 288
(2013).
57. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) (Supp. 2014).
58. Johnson, 294 Ga. at 74, 751 S.E.2d at 289; see also Johnson, 318 Ga. App. at 790,
794, 736 S.E.2d at 132, 134-35.
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liability claim arising out of the provision of emergency medical care in
a hospital emergency department ...[be] proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the physician or health care provider's actions showed
gross negligence."59 "[Cilear and convincing [evidence] is a more
stringent standard than 'preponderating' and requires a greater
quantum and a high quality of proof in plaintiff's favor."0
Johnson arose out of Shaquille Johnson's death from a bilateral
pulmonary embolism after an emergency room (ER) discharge following
treatment for chest pain by ER physician Price Paul Omondi, M.D. The
doctor took a history, conducted an exam, reviewed the diagnostic
studies he ordered, and, believing Johnson was suffering from pleurisy,
when in fact he was suffering from a pulmonary embolism, discharged
The pulmonary
him with a prescription for anti-inflammatories.
embolism, which could have been treated, ultimately took Johnson's life
days later."1
The disagreement within the panel of the court of appeals centered on
the following: (1) the standard of gross negligence, and (2) the court's
role in evaluating the evidence in light of the heightened evidentiary
standard at summary judgment.62 The majority took a greater than
usual role in weighing the evidence to find undisputed evidence of some
diligence by the ER physician to diagnose and treat Johnson, even if
negligent in some respect, as constituting at least a "slight degree of
care.'3 This was sufficient to absolve him of liability for gross negligence under the statute, entitling the defendant to summary judgment." The dissent, in contrast, focused on the plaintiff's presentation
of some evidence of a gross deviation from the minimum standard of
care, making summary judgment inappropriate because a jury question
existed regarding whether the plaintiff had presented clear and
convincing evidence of gross negligence by Dr. Omondi, thus disqualifying him from immunity under the statute.65
The supreme court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, which
had affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding the
court of appeals erred in its application of the statute by holding that
"there was no genuine issue of material fact to dispute Dr. Omondi's

59. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c).
60. Johnson, 294 Ga. at 76, 751 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting In re Estate of Burton, 265 Ga.
122, 123, 453 S.E.2d 16, 16 (1995)).
61. Johnson, 318 Ga. App. at 787, 788-89, 736 S.E.2d at 130, 131.
62. See id. at 790, 792-93, 736 S.E.2d at 132, 133-34.
63. See id. at 793-94, 736 S.E.2d at 134.
64. Id. at 794, 736 S.E.2d at 134.
65. Id. at 794-95, 736 S.E.2d at 135 (Miller, P.J., dissenting).
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argument that he could not be liable under that statute." 6 Recognizing
the difficulty presented by applying the statute at summary judgment,
the court took guidance from the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,"T stating a trial court must view the
evidence through "the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" and
answer "whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff
proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the
governing law or that he did not."' Further, the trial court "must bear
in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support
liability." s Specifically, in this case, under the heavy burden of clear
and convincing proof, the question was whether the plaintiff was able to
show "that Dr. Omondi's treatment of Shaquille constituted gross
70
negligence under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c)."
For Dr. Omondi to succeed at summary judgment, with the evidence
of the plaintiff to be believed and all inferences drawn in the plaintiff's
favor, he "was required to show that there was no genuine issue of
material fact, and that a reasonable jury would be unable to find, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he was grossly negligent."7 But a
heightened evidentiary burden and lowered standard of care, both
favoring the defendant, should not embolden the trial court at summary
judgment to weigh the plaintiff's evidence of a breach against the
defendant's undisputed evidence against a breach, as this invades the
jury's province. 72
So the question remained, what is "gross negligence" under O.C.G.A.
§ 51-1-29.5(c) and how is it applied at summary judgment? Because
gross negligence is not defined in the statute, the court returned to its
previous definition of the term in Gliemmo v. Cousinea:73
[Tihe absence of even slight diligence, and slight diligence is defined in
[O.C.G.A. § 51-1-4] as that degree of care which every man of common
sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the same or
similar circumstances ... [or] equivalent to (the) failure to exercise
even a slight degree of care, ...

or lack of the diligence that even

careless men are accustomed to exercise. 4

66. Johnson, 294 Ga. at 74, 75, 751 S.E.2d at 289.
67. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
68. Johnson, 294 Ga. at 76, 751 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254).
69. Id. at 77, 751 S.E.2d at 291 (quotingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 254).

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 78, 751 S.E.2d at 291.
See id. at 77, 751 S.E.2d at 291.
287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).
Johnson, 294 Ga. at 77-78, 751 S.E.2d at 291 (second alteration in original) (quoting

Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 12-13, 694 S.E.2d at 80) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
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To the sharp disagreement in the court of appeals as to what constituted
gross negligence, the supreme court only responded in its second footnote
that a doctor could not avoid a claim of gross negligence for failure to
exercise a "slight degree of care" by providing "merely 'some medical
care.' 75 This appeared to mean, based on the court's subsequent
reasoning and ruling, that for a plaintiff's O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) claim
to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce a qualified
expert who not only provides the standard of care but also reasonably
opines that the facts, construed in plaintiff's favor, show the defendant
medical provider failed to exercise a slight degree of care.76
In the case of Johnson, "merely some medical care" was not enough
when expert testimony from the record showed that Dr. Omondi failed
to recognize classic symptoms of an illness or to take any measures to
prove, disprove, or treat the illness.77 Words by the plaintiff's expert
regarding the ER visit and treatment, such as "classical" symptoms,
"totally irrelevant," and "ridiculous," also certainly helped the plaintiff
overcome this burden,7"
Although this opinion provides that the trial court is expected to
review the evidence under the heightened burden of clear and convincing
proof of slight care, which would seemingly make summary judgment
easier for defendants, in practice the opinion only requires that a
plaintiff produce an expert to say the condition and treatment were clear
and the doctor failed to diagnose or treat the condition. This is a rather
low hurdle if a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss because a plaintiff
is required to attach to the complaint an affidavit from a qualified expert
setting forth the gross deviation from the applicable standard of care.79
Should the opinion be read to re-affirm the province of the jury with a
nod to trial courts to limit summary judgment grants, or is this
ambiguity merely a result of the inherent difficulty and complexity in
deciding what the applicable standard of care is and the degree of
deviation in ER malpractice cases?
Recognizing these questions and the lack of a clear definition of gross
negligence to provide guidance to the courts and parties at summary
judgment, Justice Blackwell, joined by Justice Nahmias, wrote an
interesting concurrence addressing these issues.8 0 Although he seemed

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-4 (2000).
75. Johnson, 294 Ga. at 78 n.2, 751 S.E.2d at 291 n.2.
76. See id. at 79, 751 S.E.2d at 292.
77. Id. at 78-79, 751 S.E.2d at 292.
78. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See O.C.GA. § 9-11-9.1(a) (2014).
80. Johnson, 294 Ga. at 79, 86, 751 S.E.2d at 292, 296 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
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to limit his opinion to interpreting the gross-negligence-standard
component of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) and its application to summary
judgment, the concurrence provides a logical backing to the majority's
ruling and clear guidance to trial courts.8 ' Justice Blackwell accepted
the majority's definition of gross negligence and the court's reversal, but
he viewed the definition as imprecise and unhelpful to the litigants and
the courts.12 He asked, how helpful-to laymen jurors, lawyers, and
judges who typically do not have years of medical training and experience-is "expert evidence of the generally accepted standards of medical
care" in discerning what a careless and inattentive ER physician,
exercising "common sense," would have done under the circumstances?' Without medical training, these actors in the justice system must
be told (1) what the standard of care is by a qualified expert and (2)
what was the deviation from that standard." From there, they still
have to decide if the negligence was "gross."85
Looking to clarify the meaning of that term, Justice Blackwell
explored the evolution of the gross-negligence standard in the context of
personal property loss and automobile injury cases in which jurors,
judges, and lawyers could easily rely on their daily experiences with the
relevant conduct and circumstances to establish what constituted a
"slight degree of care" (that is, what would constitute a slight degree of
care by an inattentive and careless person, exercising common sense, in
the context of owning property or operating a vehicle).8 8 In contrast,
in the medical malpractice context under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c), given
the complexity of the underlying subject matter and the law, experts are
needed to explain the medical condition and treatment and to evaluate
the medical provider's care relative to the standard of care.8"
Justice Blackwell expressed the need for a definition of gross
negligence that accounts for the "generally accepted standards of medical
care" and "focuses more on the degree of deviation" from those standards.' Precedent provided helpful definitions, for example: "carelessness manifestly materially greater than want of common prudence";89
"very great negligence";90 and "[tihe culpability which characterizes all

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 79-86, 751 S.E.2d at 292-96.
See id. at 84, 751 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 81-82, 751 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 81-82, 751 S.E.2d at 293-94.
See id.
See id. at 80-81, 751 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 81, 751 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 82, 751 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. (quoting Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 474, 304 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1983)).
Id. (quoting Tidwell v. Tidwell, 92 Ga. App. 54, 57, 87 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1955)).
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negligence is, in gross negligence, magnified to a high degree as
compared with that present in ordinary negligence." 9' Justice Blackwell
found the plaintiff's proposed definition plain and workable: "[Lliability
is authorized under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) where the evidence of record,
including the admissible testimony of qualified experts, would permit a
reasonable jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant caused harm by grossly deviating from the applicable medical
standard of care."92 That is, "a substantial, gross, or 'manifestly
materially greater' deviation from the standard of care."93 Justice
Blackwell pointed out that these are not new definitions, but rather a
context of medical malpractice
refined articulation of the law in the
94
cases under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c).
Justice Blackwell found nothing in the majority opinion inconsistent
with this articulation because the court found some evidence in the
record of a substantial and gross deviation from the accepted standard
of care for a doctor in Dr. Omondi's circumstances.95 Disagreeing with
Dr. Omondi and several amici curiae, Justice Blackwell stated that the
legislative purpose of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) was not frustrated at
summary judgment by the court's ruling.96 Yes, he agreed, grants of
summary judgment may be less under the court's determination, but at
trial two statutory thumbs on the scales of justice weighed in the
medical care providers' favor in the form of the plaintiff having to prove
a greater degree of deviation from the accepted standard of care at a
heightened burden of proof, which will increase defense verdicts. 9 7 If
any of the defendant's arguments was considered the least effective, it
was the concern that summary judgment "will be no more available in
cases in which O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.59" applies than in ordinary medical
malpractice cases," thus frustrating the legislative purpose of the
statute. 99 However, nothing in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 purports to modify
the summary judgment standard, which respects the constitutional
prerogative of juries to hear disputed facts. 10 0 The summary judgment

91. Id. at 82, 751 S.E.2d at 294 (alteration in original) (quoting Hatcher v. Bray, 88
Ga. App. 344, 346, 77 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1953)).
92. Id. at 82-83, 751 S.E.2d at 294.
93. Id. at 83 n.4, 751 S.E.2d at 294 n.4.
94. Id. at 84, 751 S.E.2d at 295.

95. Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.
2014).
100.

Id. at 84-85, 751 S.E.2d at 295-96.
Id. at 84, 85-86, 751 S.E.2d at 295-96.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 (Supp. 2014).
Johnson, 294 Ga. at 84, 751 S.E.2d at 295; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 (Supp.
Johnson, 294 Ga. at 85, 751 S.E.2d at 296.
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standard requires the court to view a non-moving party's pleadings and
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accepting
the credibility of the evidence and affording that evidence "as much
weight as it reasonably can bear," and discrediting the moving party's
conflicting evidence for purposes of the motion.1 1
Interestingly, in Howland v. Wadsworth, 02 a little over a month
before the supreme court's ruling in Johnson,'° 3 Judges Ray and Miller
of the court of appeals, who had sharply disagreed over gross negligence
and summary judgment issues in their decision in that case, 0 4 revisited O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c).'
This time both judges affirmed the trial
court's denial of a directed verdict to the defendants when the jury
answered questions of fact regarding whether there was a provision of
emergency medical care that implicated O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5.106
III. PREMISES LIABILITY
This survey period the court of appeals stressed the burden on
plaintiff's attorneys to make out a prima facie case of negligence under
Georgia's premises liability law, which necessarily requires a foundational showing of a hazardous condition on the premises in the first place.
In opinions from three different panels, the court stressed that a
plaintiff's own testimony, without more, may not be enough evidence to
survive summary judgment.
For example, in Siegel v. Park Avenue Condominium Ass'n,'0 ' the
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment when the
plaintiff fell while standing within a lobby's automatic revolving door,
stating "[o]ther than her testimony that the door began to move while
she was within it, hit her foot, and caused her to fall, [the plaintiff]
presented no evidence that the automatic door malfunctioned." 0 8 The

101. Id. at 84-85, 751 S.E.2d at 296.
102. 324 Ga. App. 175, 749 S.E.2d 762 (2013), cert. denied (Jan. 27, 2014).
103. Howland was decided on October 9, 2013. Id. Johnson was decided on November
14, 2013. 294 Ga. at 74, 751 S.E.2d at 288.
104. CompareJohnson, 318 Ga. App. at 787-94, 736 S.E.2d at 129-35 (Ray, J., writing
for the majority), with Johnson, 318 Ga. App. at 794-802, 736 S.E.2d at 135-40 (Miller, P.J.,
dissenting).

105. Howland, 324 Ga. App. at 179, 181, 749 S.E.2d at 765, 767.
106. Id. at 175, 183, 749 S.E.2d at 763, 768.
107. 322 Ga. App. 337, 744 S.E.2d 876 (2013). Presiding Judge Barnes wrote the
opinion, with Judges Miller and Ray concurring. Id.
108. Id. at 337, 338, 744 S.E.2d at 877, 878. Siegel quotes directly from The Landings
Ass'n v.Williams, 291 Ga. 397, 728 S.E.2d 577 (2012), a case discussed in last year's
Survey. Siegel, 322 Ga. App. at 338, 744 S.E.2d at 878; see also Griffeth & Morris, supra
note 1, at 272-73.
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owner "submitted evidence that the automatic door was operating as it
was supposed to, and [the plaintiff! presented no evidence to the
contrary, such as expert testimony that the speed or force of the
automatic doors was excessive or the sensor that triggered the movement
was too sensitive or sited improperly."10 9
Similarly, in Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,110 the court
did not consider a multi-piece glass candle holder that shattered in a
shopper's hand a hazard, even though the shopper's lawyers tried to
"Although the
frame the facts to demonstrate such a condition.'
candle holder's globe was made of glass, and perhaps hazardous to that
extent, [the plaintiffi knew that she was handling a glass object and that
people can be cut by glass, and [the store] did not possess superior
knowledge of that danger.""' The plaintiff argued that the store
created a "hazardous condition by displaying an item that appeared to
be of one piece, but in fact consisted of multiple pieces, and by failing to
provide any signage or warning to alert an invitee that there were
fragile or multi-piece items on display.""' However, the plaintiff did
not come forward with any evidence to support that argument."
In Taylor v. Thunderbird Lanes, LLC,"5 summary judgment was
affirmed for the defendant-bowling alley" 6 when the plaintiff testified
"that she did not know why she fell and that she did not see any oil in
the approach area before the foul line because she was not looking
down.""' Her son and daughter-in-law also testified that "they did not
8
notice any oil in the approach area of the bowling lane."" The court
held that "[p]roof of a fall, without more, does not create liability on the

109. Siegel, 322 Ga. App. at 339, 744 S.E.2d at 878-79.

The court also rejected

plaintiffs negligence per se claim based on the state minimum standard building code. Id.
at 339-42, 744 S.E.2d at 879-80; see also O.C.G.A. § 8-2-20(9)(B)(i)(I) (2004).

110. 323 Ga. App. 672, 747 S.E.2d 684 (2013). Presiding Judge Andrews wrote the

opinion, with Judges Dillard and McMillian concurring. Id.
111. Id. at 672, 674, 747 S.E.2d at 685, 686.

112. Id. at 674, 747 S.E.2d at 686.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 674, 747 S.E.2d at 686. "[Tlhere [was] a lack of evidence that Hobby Lobby
could reasonably expect, absent exceptional circumstances, that a customer would view a
multi-piece candle holder as a one-piece vase and so handle it in a way leading to injury."

Id. at 675, 747 S.E.2d at 686-87.

115. 324 Ga. App. 167, 171, 748 S.E.2d 308, 312 (2013). Judge DUllard wrote the
opinion, with Presiding Judge Andrews and Judge McMillian concurring. Id.
116. The bowling alley operated under the name Stars and Strikes Family Entertainment Center and Bowling Alley. Id. at 167, 748 S.E.2d at 309.
117. Id. at 167, 168, 748 S.E.2d at 309, 310.

118. Id. at 168, 748 S.E.2d at 310.
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part of a proprietor or landowner, because it is common knowledge that
people fall on the best of sidewalks and floors."" 9
In Bryan Bank & Trust v. Steele, 2 ' Judge Boggs, writing for a
different panel of the court, quoted Judge Dillard's opinion in Taylor to
reverse a denial of summary judgment on interlocutory appeal because
the plaintiff "failed to point to specific evidence of the existence of a
hazard, and therefore failed to establish causation."'' The court in
Steele held that the plaintiff's evidence of the fall's cause was "only
'admitted speculation.""
' '2
Even if a plaintiff can prove a hazardous condition sufficient to
withstand a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must also show
actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the premises owner and
that a defendant's knowledge is superior to that of the plaintiff. As
actual knowledge is more unusual, the case law this survey period
continued to center around proof of constructive knowledge. In two slipand-fall cases, the same panel of the court affirmed summary judgment
23
to the premises owner.

119. Id. at 169, 748 S.E.2d at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Glynn-Brunswick
Mem'l Hosp. Auth. v. Benton, 303 Ga. App. 305,307, 693 S.E.2d 566, 568(2010)). Multiple
opinions by the panel of Presiding Judge Barnes and Judges Miller and Ray have dealt
with the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of a plaintiffs evidence. See Hayes v. SNS P'ship, LP,
326 Ga. App. 185, 188, 756 S.E.2d 273,276 (2014) ("[Llay opinions of [the plaintiff) and her
daughter ... fall short of providing evidence of a defect in the door when [the plaintiff]
fell."); Martin v. Hansen, 326 Ga. App. 91, 94, 755 S.E.2d 892, 895 (2014) ("Since [the
owners' affidavit] pierced [the plaintiffs] pleadings, she was required to set forth specific
facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the [the owners]' knowledge of
the defective stair .... [The plaintiff] failed to provide any such admissible evidence"). The
panel of Chief Judge Phipps, Presiding Judge Ellington, and Judge Branch also decided a
case on this issue, holding that the plaintiff failed to show "that the moisture ...was a
hazardous condition that exposed her to an unreasonable risk of harm." Season All Flower
Shop, Inc. v. Rorie, 323 Ga. App. 529, 534, 746 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2013). Chief Judge Phipps
relied on Robinson v.Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997), and heavily upon
Hayward v. Kroger Co., 317 Ga. App. 795, 733 S.E.2d 7 (2012), which was discussed in last
year's Survey. See Season All Flower Shop, Inc., 323 Ga. App. at 533 n.6, 535 n.16, 536
n.19, 537 n.20, 746 S.E.2d at 638 n.6, 639 n.16, 640 nn.19-20; see also Griffeth & Morris,
supra note 1, at 271 & n.54.
120. 326 Ga. App. 13, 15, 755 S.E.2d 828, 830 (2014). Judges Boggs wrote the opinion,
with Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge McFadden concurring.
121. Id. at 13, 755 S.E.2d at 828.
122. Id. at 14-15, 755 S.E.2d at 829-30 (quoting Avery v. Cleveland Ave. Motel, Inc.,
239 Ga. App. 644, 645, 521 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1999)) (distinguishing J.H. Harvey Co. v.
Reddick, 240 Ga. App. 466, 522 S.E.2d 749 (1999)).
123. See generally Pirkle v. Quiktrip Corp., 325 Ga. App. 597, 754 S.E.2d 387 (2014);
Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 324 Ga. App. 105, 749 S.E.2d 400 (2013). Both cases
were decided by the panel of Presiding Judge Barnes and Judges Miller and Ray. Pirkle,
325 Ga. App. at 597, 754 S.E.2d at 387; Houston, 324 Ga. App. at 105, 749 S.E.2d at 400.
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In Pirkle v. Quiktrip Corp.,'24 the plaintiff cited the deposition of a
witness who entered the store before the plaintiff and saw "an employee
[And later] [a] wet floor sign...
midway down the aisle mopping ....
was visible on the [store] video, ...

but no mop or bucket could be
26

best.'
The court found such evidence to be "speculative at
seen."
Further, the plaintiff could not show constructive knowledge according
12
to the store video and an affidavit from the store cashier. ' The court
considered the affidavit of another store employee as well as the
manager's testimony to conclude the store "presented evidence of its
inspection procedures and evidence that those procedures had been done
that morning approximately eight minutes before [the plaintiff's] fall and
the store had been found free of spills." 2'
1 29
Similarly, in Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P,' the court
concluded the plaintiff "had equal knowledge of the hazard that caused
his fall."' 30 As with many of these cases, "defendants relied upon a
DVD recording of the camera footage and screenshots taken from the
footage to support their motion," as well as the plaintiff's "deposition
testimony in which he admitted that he had seen the flattened
cardboard boxes lying on the floor, that he had walked across the boxes
he slipped and fell on the same boxes as
once without incident, and that
13 1
12'

he walked back over them."

However, in two cases the court reversed grants of summary judgment
to the premises owners, concluding that questions of fact remained for
12
jury determination. In Bright v. Sandstone Hospitality, LLC, 1 the
plaintiff was using a grab bar to pull himself up from a tub when the
bar pulled loose from the wall and he fell. The plaintiff argued that,
because the grab bar had to be repaired previously, there was a jury
question regarding the owner's exercise of ordinary care. Further, the
general manager testified that hotel owners should inspect guest rooms
for hazards or defects that could cause injury, and while the hotel had
a regular maintenance schedule, during her time as general manager,
the grab bars were never tested to see if they could sustain a 300-pound
load. One of the owners testified that neither he nor the LLC had the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

325 Ga. App. 597, 754 S.E.2d 387 (2014).
Id. at 600, 754 S.E.2d at 390.
Id. at 601, 754 S.E.2d at 390.
Id. at 601, 602, 754 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 602, 754 S.E.2d at 391.

129. 324 Ga. App. 105, 749 S.E.2d 400 (2013).
130. Id. at 107, 749 S.E.2d at 401.

131. Id. at 106, 749 S.E.2d at 401.
132. 327 Ga. App. 157, 163, 755 S.E.2d 899, 905 (2014). Judge Ray wrote the opinion,

with Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Miller concurring. Id.
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building inspected for safety issues prior to operating it as a hotel.'3 3
The court held that a jury could find that Sandstone lacked reasonable
inspection procedures and "thus had at least constructive knowledge of
13 4
the defect."
In Pinder v. H&H Food Services, LLC,'35 the court also reversed a
grant of summary judgment to the defendant.3 6 First, the court
determined that issues of fact remained "as to whether the conditions on
the Property at the time of [the plaintiff's] fall created a hazard," even
though the plaintiff produced no expert testimony to demonstrate any
flaw in the construction or design of the handicap ramp.'37 Second,
the court determined that "the change in elevation at the sides of the
ramp, the lack of any warning regarding that change, and the amount
of lighting in the area were static conditions," so the defendant was, "at
least, on constructive notice regarding these conditions." 3 s Finally,
even though the case involved a static defect or condition, the court held
that there were issues of fact regarding whether the plaintiff "should
have seen the hazard and whether she exercised reasonable care for her
39
own safety ((that is], whether she was negligent)."
140
Lamar v. All American Quality Foods,Inc. comes from an interesting procedural posture. The case made it to a jury trial; the defense did
not put on any evidence; the jury returned a defense verdict; the plaintiff
then moved for a new trial contending the court erred by refusing to
charge the jury on the law of constructive knowledge and by failing to

133. Id. at 158, 161-62, 163, 755 S.E.2d at 901, 904, 905.
134. Id. at 163, 755 S.E.2d at 905; see also Avery, 239 Ga. App. at 644,646, 521 S.E.2d
at 669, 670 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate regarding the issue of a
hotel's constructive knowledge where the plaintiff grabbed a handrail on the hotel stairway
to stop herself from falling because there was evidence that the hotel owner lacked
reasonable inspection procedures); Wilkerson v. Charles W. Bell & Assocs., P. C., 205 Ga.
App. 779, 781, 423 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1992) (holding that where a plaintiff asserts improper
construction amounting to negligence, a landowner may be liable regardless of whether it
knew of defects in original construction).
.135. 326 Ga. App. 493, 503, 756 S.E.2d 721, 728 (2014). Judge McMillian
wrote the
opinion, with Judge DiUllard concurring and Presiding Judge Andrews concurring in
judgment only. Id.
136. Id. at 493, 756 S.E.2d at 722.
137. Id. at 497-98, 756 S.E.2d at 725.
138. Id. at 499-500, 756 S.E.2d at 726.
139. Id. at 501, 756 S.E.2d at 727.
140. 323 Ga. App. 572, 746 S.E.2d 665 (2013). Judge Branch wrote the opinion, with
Chief Judge Phipps and Presiding Judge Ellington concurring. Id.
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respond to the jury's question regarding the meaning of "constructive
knowledge."'" The court agreed, holding,
[P]retermitting the question as to whether the failure to give part of
the requested charge was substantial and harmful error, we conclude
the trial court erred by failing to respond to the jury's question asking
for the meaning of the term "constructive knowledge" and that
therefore, [the plaintiff] is entitled to a new trial.'
The jury asked for
another meaning of constructive knowledge, ...

[aInd although the

trial court charged the jury [generally] on... negligence, the duties of
an owner or occupier of land, and the fact that an invitee must prove
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard,
it neither instructed the jury on the inferences authorized by law that
allow a plaintiff to establish the defendant's constructive knowledge of
regarding a proprietor's duty to
a hazard nor gave any instruction
143
inspect for hazardous conditions.
Practitioners would do well to request written jury charges on these
inferences and duties, make sure they are included in the record for
appeal, and track the language approved by our appellate courts.'"
In perhaps the most significant slip-and-fall case from this survey
period, Kroger Co. v. Schoenhoff,141 the seven-judge panel of the court
of appeals affirmed a trial court's denial of a directed verdict motion
allowing a plaintiff's verdict of $2,640,000 (plus $150,000 for the
husband's loss of consortium) to stand. 146 At approximately six o'clock
in the afternoon, the plaintiffs (husband and wife) entered the store with
their young daughter, and after shopping for about thirty-five to fortyfive minutes, the wife returned to the produce section to get a bag of
141. Id. at 572, 746 S.E.2d at 666. In a note, the court pointed out that while the
plaintiff submitted some written proposed jury instructions, they were not in the record.
Id. at 573 n.1, 746 S.E.2d at 667 n.1.
142. Id. at 576, 746 S.E.2d at 668-69.
143. Id. at 577, 746 S.E.2d at 669-70.
144. While the court noted in a footnote that the "Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions
(5th Ed.) do not include a charge on the meaning of the term 'constructive knowledge,'" id.
at 578 n.2, 746 S.E.2d at 670 n.2; see also COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GA.,
SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (5th ed. 2007), maybe this should be added. The
court approved an instruction on constructive knowledge based on the law as stated in
Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980). Lamar,323 Ga. App.
at 578, 746 S.E.2d at 670.
145. 324 Ga. App. 619, 751 S.E.2d 438 (2013). Judge McMillian wrote the opinion, with
Chief Judge Phipps, Presiding Judge Doyle, and Judges Dillard, McFadden, and Boggs
concurring. Id. Presiding Judge Andrews dissented. Id.
146. Id. at 619, 751 S.E.2d at 439.
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lettuce and slipped and fell in water in front of the floral display case.
The store had no actual knowledge of the substance on the floor. The
store was unable to prove it conducted any sweeps or inspections of the
area where she fell on the date in question. The store safety policy
required inspections on at least an hourly basis, but the plaintiffs did
not show how long the water had been on the floor. The case proceeded
to trial, and the store moved for a directed verdict. The trial court
1 47
denied the motion.
The court of appeals noted that a former Kroger employee had on
other occasions observed water on the floor in the floral area; there was
evidence that water would drip on the floor in that area as shoppers took
the flowers out of vases; several witnesses, including store employees,
said non-skid floor mats were often used in floral area (though no
evidence showed such mats were on the floor on the date of the fall); and
finally the fall occurred on a Saturday (a busy weekend day).4
Therefore, even though the evidence was not overwhelming,
it provided a sufficient basis from which the jury could infer that the
spill had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time such that the
Store employees would have discovered it and cleaned it up had they
been adhering to reasonable inspection procedures, and therefore
Kroger had construction knowledge of the hazard.149
The court "recognize[d] the criticisms of the summary judgment
standard for slip-and-fall cases established in Straughterv. J.H.Harvey
Co.," but concluded it "need not reconsider Straughter here". 5 ' Judge
Andrews filed a dissent "[blecause there was no evidence produced at
trial sufficient to prove that Kroger had superior constructive knowledge
of the hazard."' 5 '

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 620-23, 751 S.E.2d at 440-42.
Id. at 622, 751 S.E.2d at 441.
Id.
Id. at 623,751 S.E.2d at 442; see also Straughter v. J.H. Harvey Co., 232 Ga. App.

29, 500 S.E.2d 353 (1998). Examples of these criticisms include Williams v. GKMahavir,
Inc., 314 Ga. App. 758, 763-64, 726 S.E.2d 71, 76 (2012) (Andrews, J., concurring
dubitante), a case discussed in Phillip Comer Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 287, 292 & n.40 (2012), and Benefield v.
Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605, 611, 708 S.E.2d 563, 569 (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring

dubitante), a case discussed in Philip Comer Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 63

MERCER

L. REv. 343, 350 & n.60 (2011).

151. Schoenhoff, 324 Ga. App. at 629, 751 S.E.2d at 445.
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CONCLUSION

This survey period was relatively stable, with no personnel changes on
15 2
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case
increasing
the
judges continue to talk about
and how to deal
budgets)
tight
of
(particularly amidst the recent years
of judges on
number
the
and
courts
with the jurisdictions of both
53
General
Georgia
the
in
How these discussions proceed
each.
tort
future
impact
definitely
Assembly (if they gain any traction) would
would
panels
more
cases, particularly in the court of appeals, because
likely result in more cases being heard by the entire court if the threejudge panels cannot agree.

152. Supreme Court Justice Carol W. Hunstein has, however, announced that she will
not seek re-election. See Len Horton, Justice Hunstein Honoredfor Donation,20 GA. B.J.
49, 49 (2014).
153. See Alyson M. Palmer, Judges, Lawyers Mull Possible Changes to State Appeals
Court, FULTON CNTY. DAiLY REPORT, Feb. 13, 2014, at 1.

